NOREF - Consequences of the political deadlock in Bahrain on reforms in the Gulf

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Elsa Foucraut

Elsa Foucraut holds a master’s degree in Middle East Studies from Sciences Po, Paris, where she studied Gulf Politics. She has worked extensively on economic and political reform in the Gulf region and Egypt. In 2010, she obtained a scholarship from CEFAS (a French research centre for the Gulf r...
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Consequences of the political deadlock in Bahrain on reforms in the Gulf

Elsa Foucraut , 5 April 2011

Summary

Today’s unrest in Bahrain is deep-rooted and should be viewed in a local, domestic context that dates back to the “Manama Spring” of the 1990s. Despite having made undeniable progress, the top-down reformist approach adopted by King Hamad and his son, Sheikh Salman, for over ten years has failed to rein in political resentment in the country. In the Gulf, where politics is largely dominated by tribes and oil, the removal of the Al Khalifah family is nigh on impossible, and even more so after the Saudi Arabian military intervention in the country.

Fears that the unrest may spread to other Gulf states has sparked attention, particularly given the current political vacuum in Riyadh. However, although Saudi Arabia faces the same socioeconomic challenges as Bahrain, its immense wealth gives it much greater scope than Bahrain to defuse any popular discontent. There are no signs of impending change in Qatar and the UAE, whose gigantic oil and gas reserves and small populations mean they do not face the same kinds of pressures. In Oman, although there have been unexpectedly violent protests about economic issues, the Sultan remains genuinely popular. Kuwait, where the parliament already challenges the ruling family, has seen protests around citizenship issues but these are unlikely to have an impact outside the country.

Therefore, the risk that major unrest will spill over into other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from Bahrain is still small – although we must now be prepared to think the unthinkable. On the other hand, the Bahraini model could have a more subtle, long-term influence over the region. It is therefore important for European policy-makers to encourage reforms in Bahrain and to seize the opportunity to refocus the EU-GCC relationship away from oil security concerns and broaden dialogue with those countries to include civil and human rights.