The conflict in Western Sahara has been simmering since 1975 and has been on the UN Security Council agenda for over twenty years. In 2007, Morocco offered the territory autonomy within the borders of the Moroccan state. This proposed solution is supported by key international players, including France and the US, which have long-standing ties with Morocco and perceive an independent Western Sahara as a potentially weak state. However, the idea is staunchly opposed by Polisario, (the Western Saharan independence movement), and by its allies among African states (primarily Algeria) and within Western civil society. This opposition to autonomy is founded on the principle of the right to self-determination for the Western Saharan population.
A number of obstacles to the proposed solution – such as the exact borders of the autonomous region, the division of Western Saharan resources, and police and army presence – have been identified, but one in particular has been largely overlooked; can autonomy for Western Sahara work in the context of a Morocco which is still largely non-democratic? This question is particularly relevant in the current political climate in the Middle East and North Africa.
Generally speaking, autonomous arrangements in non-democracies have tended to function less well and/or to be more unstable. Both analysis and emerging international norms on the matter point in the same direction: autonomy can only truly exist within a democratic system.
Morocco, even after a decade of real but hesitant and piecemeal reform, remains a monarchy where the king effectively holds all levers of power – executive, legislative, judicial, military, and spiritual. So far, democracy protests in the country have been comparatively small-scale and the sincerity of the king’s promise of extensive constitutional reform has been met with doubt.
Questions thus arise as to the feasibility of autonomy within the current Moroccan political system. These include the concern that such a solution would create imbalances between a democratically self-governing Western Sahara (enjoying for example full freedom of expression and the legalisation of the majority of political parties) and an authoritarian Morocco. A true transfer of power to a regional entity within the current system – in which the prerogatives of the king are vast – would be patently difficult. Western Saharan representation and conflict resolution vis-à-vis a non-democratic Moroccan state would go against the grain of how the Moroccan system functions. More fundamentally, the rule of law and full respect for human rights, widely considered key to the smooth functioning of autonomous regions, would have to be instituted – a major step which the Moroccan government has so far been unwilling to take. Lastly, the clientelistic networks that underpin the current system of power in Morocco and which are also entrenched in Western Sahara would have to be uprooted.
In conclusion, some recommendations are made on how to advance negotiations for a final settlement of the Western Sahara conflict in the current context of transformation across the Middle East. Transitions can offer rare windows of opportunity to solve deadlocked conflicts. It would therefore seem sensible for the international community to make preparations, including informal talks between international and regional actors, a more fleshed-out autonomy proposal, and a renewed search for alternative solutions such as associate statehood or shared sovereignty. At the same time, recent history has showed that minorities and other vulnerable groups are often at greater risk in transition periods. This means that special attention to the Western Saharan situation is currently warranted. Above all, new attitudes of respect which avoid the disdainful rhetoric of the past must be promoted and nurtured.
