Executive summary

A well-functioning government is a prerequisite for any successful counter-insurgency strategy and good governance is unlikely to be established in Afghanistan any time soon. As a consequence, the plans for the build-up of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) must be adjusted. This build-up is not only an exit strategy; it is a cover for a “graceful exit”, serving a perceptual function in western publics. But in counter-insurgency theory a disconnect between governance and security is anathema.

The end-state projection of 400,000 soldiers and police is unsustainable and ill-adapted to Afghanistan’s socio-economic and political foundations. Furthermore, the continued growth of centralized and corrupt security forces could very well lead to increased resistance. The ANSF – like any armed force – is in dire need of a credible and motivating cause, simply to avoid disintegration.

President Barack Obama has taken some useful steps in readjusting threat perceptions emanating from Afghanistan. But this must be followed by a realignment of the current plans for the ANSF. US ambitions for the indigenous security forces must parallel General McChrystal’s strategy of focusing coalition troops on a few population centres. The overriding concern of the Afghans continues to be general insecurity, which is caused by a weak and corrupt regime locked in competition with a resurgent Taliban.

The focus on building the ANSF must be on quality and sustainability rather than quantity. Spreading out an ill-prepared force of semi-literate and abusive policemen and soldiers would do little to convince Afghans that they are better off without the Taliban.