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Hopes that President Obama will inaugurate a new era in hemispheric relations were expressed at the Fifth Summit of the Americas. However, greater US military presence in Colombia, together with a rather ambiguous initial reaction to the ousting of President Zelaya of Honduras, has raised questions about US intentions. Latin America has demonstrated increasing confidence in its capacity to shape its own agenda and redefine its place in the changing international system. Therefore, a review of Latin America’s relations with the US is in order. The controversy surrounding events in Colombia and Honduras indicates that old paradigms have run their course. By seeking common solutions to shared problems, South American countries are strengthening their mutual relations and making a significant contribution to reshaping global governance.
The Fifth Summit of the Americas, held in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2009, ended on a high note. Sincere expressions of goodwill in Port of Spain raised cautious, even hopeful, expectations that Barack Obama’s election would launch a new era in hemispheric relations.
However, two recent events have cast a shadow over these hopes. First was the revelation that the US was discreetly negotiating an expanded military presence in Colombian bases. In addition to this, Washington initially showed a strong reluctance to adopt coercive measures to force the coup leaders who overthrew President Zelaya of Honduras in June 2009 to back down. What do these two events, which have dominated the Latin American agenda and headlines, have in common? And more importantly, what do they reveal about the prospects for establishing effective dialogue in the Americas?
The answers should first be sought in Latin American history, which reveals a chronology of oppressive US economic and military presence. This overwhelming influence impacted heavily on the economic, political and institutional development of many of these countries. No matter what one’s standpoint is, this hegemony has affected the region’s self-image and, needless to say, its outlook towards the US.
While history sheds light, present events provide concrete explanations. The 2008 financial meltdown further undermined the shaky foundations of US global power. This waning influence is perhaps most obvious in strategically peripheral regions such as Latin America. As a counterpoint, the region’s surprisingly robust response to the financial crisis has reinforced its growing self-confidence to shape its own agenda and redefine its role in an increasingly multipolar world. This point is underscored by Latin America’s strong representation in new global power centres, such as the G-20, of which Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are active members. Moreover, emerging powers, such as China and India, are courting the region both economically and politically. It therefore stands to reason that Latin America should take a long hard look at its relationship with the US.
Latin American-US relations have always been subject to violent mood swings ranging from blind fatalism to aggressive finger-wagging. Perhaps the time has come to accept that what is good for the US is not necessarily good for Latin American interests, nor automatically incompatible either. The challenge is to establish a relationship based on mutual respect and focused on building a true partnership.
There is, however, no ready-made, painless recipe for achieving such a momentous transformation. In Port of Spain, President Obama suggested that opening a new chapter in hemispheric relations meant not being “trapped by the past”. Rhetorical gestures and sincere words notwithstanding, a genuine willingness to engage on this painful historical overhang is required, if forward-looking solutions are to be found. The challenge is to build trust. But how can this be achieved, when almost any event or gesture is viewed from sharply different or even contradictory perspectives?
The issue of the Colombian bases provides a useful starting point. Why did Washington not communicate beforehand its intention to expand its military presence in Colombia? If it simply failed to imagine that this move would provoke such a storm, this reveals a regrettable insensitivity. The situation is graver, however, if the decision was concealed to avoid coming under pressure to reverse what was a patently unacceptable measure.
The answer appears to lie in Washington’s silence in the face of President Lula’s request that the US – as well as Colombia - offer legally binding guarantees that the bases would not be used to launch unauthorized actions on South American soil. Such an agreement would in fact require the US to formally renounce the right to intervene unilaterally in the region or anywhere. How could it retain the status of a superpower under such conditions? The message is clear: throwbacks to Cold War mentality no longer have a place in this part of the world.
The legacy of the Monroe Doctrine has also moulded the US response to the June coup in Honduras. It was only after a rather tentative and ambiguous first reaction that Washington was persuaded to adopt stronger sanctions against the ringleaders. Why was the US so reluctant to apply the full force of its economic and political clout to induce the return of the legitimate president? Simply suspending preferential trade tariffs would have forced the hand of the coup leaders, as 80% of Honduras’ trade is US-based. The Inter-American Democratic Charter, so passionately defended at the Organisation of American States Summit in 2009, ironically held in Honduras, leaves no room for doubt. Zelaya’s dramatic re-entry into Honduran politics, after being smuggled into the country, has since seen the US take a more robust position and actively engage in the on-going efforts to strike a deal to reinstate Zelaya.
The implications of what is currently happening in Tegucigalpa should not be underestimated. It is not mere institutional formalism that is at stake. The attempt by a conservative president, albeit unskilfully, to change political direction in Central American’s most impoverished country sheds light on the political transformations taking place throughout the entire continent. That his political adversaries, who had broad control over Congress and the judiciary, still thought it necessary to oust him by force is equally significant.
The popular unrest that followed his removal and later return suggests that Zelaya’s left-leaning policies touched a raw nerve in Honduran society, and in its entrenched elites. Just as significant, the final outcome – whichever way it goes - will be scrutinized throughout the continent, particularly by extremist groups on both sides of the political spectrum, impatient with the slow working of the machinery of democracy.
In these circumstances, Washington’s initial reluctance to put more pressure on the Honduran golpistas gives rise to concern. It appealed to sophistry by accusing its critics of hypocrisy for demanding US “intervention” in Honduras, while at the same time denouncing Washington’s undue involvement in Colombia. In fact, the request for putting pressure on Honduras was in direct response to an OAS ruling. This behaviour begs the question whether the US is finally willing to subordinate its actions to international norms, especially on security matters which impact US strategic assets.
President Obama’s address to the United Nations General Assembly is not reassuring in this regard. He echoed the State Department’s initial response on Honduras when he suggested rather testily that, since the international community no longer seems to look to the US for global leadership, Washington should not have to shoulder the responsibility for solving the world’s problems either. The risk is that, as the US feels its international legitimacy wane, it may be tempted to shun troublesome international engagements – even under a multilateral remit. Would the US be willing today to intervene in Haiti, as it did in 1994, even under a Security Council mandate? Of greater concern is that it may once again feel tempted to resort to undercover methods to pursue the dangerously elastic concept of “national security.”
US behaviour on the Colombia bases issue could be interpreted as pointing in this direction. There can be no question of Colombia’s sovereign right to invite US troops on its soil. President Lula and other regional leaders have made this clear while, at the same time, questioning its appropriateness. President Uribe has rightly recalled that over the years only the US has provided Colombia with substantial support in its fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The truth is that for a long time Colombia was wary of requesting collaboration from its neighbours, so the question is why?
Colombia avoided requesting outside help largely for fear of internationalising the dispute and having to recognize the FARC as a belligerent force. Therefore, its priority was not to seek a negotiated solution, a position long defended by many of its neighbours. In order to avoid internationalising the conflict, Colombia decided to “North Americanise” it. Notwithstanding the rights and wrongs of Colombia’s refusal to negotiate peace with what it considers a terrorist organization, one fact remains. Any increase in US military presence on the continent – whatever the pretext – revives bad memories, above all when that presence is at the invitation of a government which is ideologically opposed to many of its neighbours.
The summit of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) held in Bariloche, Argentina, in August 2009, was the continent’s first attempt to provide a concerted response to these issues. During a UNASUR Defence Council follow-up meeting a few weeks later, the implications of increased US military presence in South America were thrashed out. Just as important, Colombian concerns over arms purchases by some of its neighbours, as well as military agreements with extra-regional powers, were also discussed.
Such issues have been on the table for some time but had not been discussed so openly. The summit set the stage for a sea-change in regional security politics: replacing election-minded jingoistic rhetoric with open and objective debate on issues that should unite – but in reality divide – South America. President Uribe’s decision – and of the other South American leaders – to attend the Bariloche summit raises hopes that South America is finally ready to set aside its long-standing habit of either ignoring its in-house problems or looking overseas for ready-made answers.
South America is slowly coming to accept that it must look itself in the mirror. To come to terms with national frailties and their interaction with wider regional vulnerabilities requires building trust and a sense of shared identity. The challenge is on.
None of this is to suggest that the US should be isolated. Neither should its legitimate hemispheric security concerns be denied, such as fighting drug trafficking and transnational crime. It does mean, however, that South America must present a united front and coherent proposals, if it expects to be taken seriously by the superpower.
The long-standing face-off in Colombia and the recent crisis in Honduras both point in the same direction. Old-style à la carte multilateralism, which alternates with unilateral intervention or disengagement as best serves perceived US national security priorities, has run its course. While global power becomes increasingly dispersed, extant international institutions have become brittle, and the US appetite to impose pax Americana has waned.
Latin Americans will do both themselves and global governance a major service by grasping the opportunity to address a long history of border disputes, social unrest and political upheavals. This is what the age-old Bolivarian dream of forging a common identity is all about: achieving the full potential of a region destined to be a global breadbasket, but where children still go hungry; a continent endowed with a rich abundance of natural resources, but where energy blackouts are common and wealth lives side by side with huge pockets of poverty and despair.
Moulding a truly meaningful agenda also requires no longer blaming others, especially the Yanks, for all the region’s ills. Admitting faults and taking responsibilities seriously will open a window for productive collaboration with the US. The broad welcome accorded to President Lula’s proposal for a UNASUR meeting with President Obama is a good sign. A response from President Obama is pending. This desire for re-engaging with the US on new terms is not exclusively South American. It is an aspiration that unites the whole of Latin America. That is why President Zelaya wanted the Honduran issue be taken up in Bariloche.
In contrast to developments elsewhere, by extending an open hand in the Americas, the US will almost always be greeted by an eager handshake. After all, that is precisely what Americans south of Rio Bravo are beginning to learn among themselves: reaching out to old adversaries over the barriers of apparently insoluble differences and entrenched enmities to build a common agenda for the future.