Summary

Israel’s approach to Turkey and Iran must be understood against the backdrop of its “periphery doctrine” of forming alliances with non-Arab and non-Muslim regional actors and its search for a Middle Eastern identity. The “periphery strategy” it pursued in the 1950s led to alliances with, among others, Turkey and Iran, who were viewed as natural allies against the hostile and powerful Arab “centre” spearheaded by Nasserism. In Israel’s eyes, “periphery” peoples also seemed to have broadly accepted the legitimacy of having a Jewish state in the heart of the Middle East.

Though the Arab core may have begun to accommodate Israel, it has not become fully reconciled to the idea of Jewish self-determination. The current fragility of a number of states in the Arab world, and the loss of influence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, leave Israel increasingly fearful of the regional ambitions of the Islamist regimes in Turkey and Iran. It sees Turkey as having betrayed the old alliance formed between the two countries in the face of a hostile Arab world and has thus been reluctant to respond positively to Turkey’s offers to mediate in Israel’s disputes with Islamists and Syria. Tentative efforts to do so were scuppered by the Israeli attack on Gaza in December 2009 and relations with Turkey have seriously deteriorated since the flotilla incident in May 2010.

If Israel is to change its approach to Turkey and discover the possible advantages of dealing with a regional power whose foreign policy departures have increased its commerce and influence in Asia, Europe and the Middle East, it will have to abandon its “periphery thinking”. As for Iran, Israel needs to separate its calculations in dealing with Tehran’s hostility from over-optimistic assessments of the fragility of the Iranian regime. In short, it needs to recognise the regional facts of life.